The increased use of online market places (like eBay) by professional traders and small businesses goes along with an increase in demand for online multi-unit auction designs. A seller with many objects for sale might consider it inconvenient to initiate and monitor a single auction for each individual item and thus might favour the use of a multi-unit auction. However, the design of online mul...

We discuss the design of a hybrid mechanism for e-procurement, which implements a multi-attribute combinatorial auction, followed by a bargaining process to achieve desirable procurement transaction outcomes. For the auction phase of the mechanism, we discuss incentive-compatible bidding strategies for suppliers, and how the buyer should determine the winning suppliers. In the follow-on bargain...

Multi-attribute resource allocation problems involves the allocation of resources on the basis of several attributes, therefore, the definition of a fairness method for this kind of auctions should be formulated from a multidimensional perspective. Under such point of view, fairness should take into account all the attributes involved in the allocation problem, since focusing in just a single a...

Abstract We study three alternative implementations of the Vickrey (1961) multi-unit demand auction: Vickrey’s original static sealed-bid auction and two dynamic alternatives, with and without public dropout information reported during the auction (Ausubel, 2004). Although implemented by a weaker solution concept, behavior in the dynamic Vickrey auction with the public dropout information comes...

Because of the complexity of decision-making environment, the uncertainty of fuzziness and the uncertainty of grey maybe coexist in the problems of multi-attribute group decision making. In this paper, we study the problems of multi-attribute group decision making with hybrid grey attribute data (the precise values, interval numbers and linguistic fuzzy variables coexist, and each attribute val...

In this paper we explore and analyze the structure of Internet auctions from an analytical and an empirical perspective. Such web-based auctions are rapidly emerging as a mercantile process of choice in the electronic marketplace. We observe current Internet auctions for one-time products, such as rapidly aging hardware, and analyze them within the framework of the existing auction theory. Whil...

This article focuses on mechanism design in public procurement settings involving combinatorial auctions. An important difference between combinatorial and forward auctions for procurement is that multiple attributes of the items for sale must be represented, since buying is more complicated than selling. We propose a new mechanism for multi-attribute combinatorial procurement auctions by revis...

Assignment Auctions Paul Milgrom April 10, 2008 Abstract. We propose a new auction for selling goods that are close substitutes. The design is a direct mechanism that is compact, easy to implement, respects integer constraints, and is a “tight” simplification of a standard direct competitive mechanism. Connections are established between the assignment auction and the Vickrey auction, the unifo...