We analyze how sharing rules affect Nash equilibria in Bertrand games, where the sharing of profits at ties is a decisive assumption. Necessary conditions for either positive or zero equilibrium profits are derived. Zero profit equilibria are shown to exist under weak conditions if the sharing rule is “sign-preserving”. For Bertrand markets we define the class of “expectation sharing rules”, wh...

This paper applies game theory to address the problem of allocating profits among fishing nations, once the countries concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement through a Regional Fishery Management Organization (RFMO). Proposing the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for division of profits, we argue that existing RFMOs can be expanded by means of the...

This paper studies action-based reinforcement learning in finite perfectinformation games. Restrictions on the valuation updating rule that that are necessary and sufficient for the play to converge to a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) are identified. These conditions encompass well-known examples of reinforcement learning and are mild enough to contain other interesting and plausible l...

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves e¢ ciency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields e¢ cient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to sc...

The paper studies the cumulative proportional reinforcement (CPR) rule, according to which an agent plays, at each period, an action with a probability proportional to the cumulative utility that the agent has obtained with that action. the asymptotic properties of this learning process are examined for a decision-maker under risk, where it converges almost surely toward the expected utility ma...

We analyze bilateral bargaining over a finite set of alternatives. We look for “good” ordinal solutions to such problems and show that Unanimity Compromise and Rational Compromise are the only bargaining rules that satisfy a basic set of properties. We then extend our analysis to admit problems with countably infinite alternatives. We show that, on this class, no bargaining rule choosing finite...

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to ...

This paper studies the existence of equilibrium solution concepts in a large class of economic models with discontinuous payoff functions. The issue is well understood for Nash equilibria, thanks to Reny’s betterreply security condition (Reny (1999)), and its recent improvements (Barelli and Meneghel (2013); McLennan et al. (2011); Reny (2009, 2011)). We propose new approaches, related to Reny’...

This paper introduces an evolutionary dynamics based on imitate the better realization (IBR) rule. Under this rule, agent in a population game imitates strategy of randomly chosen opponent whenever opponent’s realized payoff is higher than his or her own. Such behavior generates mean which depends order payoffs, but not their magnitudes, and polynomial utilization frequencies. We demonstrate th...

background: nonalcoholic steatohepatitis (nash), a progressive stage of nonalcoholic fatty liver disease (nafld), is characterized by steatosis with inflammation. investigations have suggested that oxidative stress may play an important role in the progress of nafld to nash. to provide further insights into beneficial effects of antioxidants in nash prevention, we employed two manganese-superox...