It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some ...

auctions have been as a competitive method of buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. double auctions and negotiation on multiple attributes create more advantages compared to single-sided and single-attribute auctions. nonetheless, this adds the complexity of the auctio...

We propose a new approach to the normative analysis of public-good provision. In addition to individual incentive compatibility, we impose conditions of robust implementability and coalition proofness. Under these additional conditions, participants’ contributions can only depend on the level of public-good provision. For a public good that comes as a single indivisible unit, provision can only...

This paper examines the relationship between coalition-proof Nash equilibria based on different dominance relations. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999) pointed out that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak domination does not necessarily coincide with that under strict domination. We show that, if a game satisfies the conditions of anonymity, monotone externality, and strateg...

In environments where players interact repeatedly, it is natural to assume that players can communicate and hence coordinate their actions. This paper offers a theory of self-enforcing agreements in infinitely repeated games as an alternative to the notion of renegotiation-proofness. The notion of stable (selfenforcing) agreements is defined and its central (distinct) feature is that in contemp...

We study manipulability in elections when the number of candidates is large. Elections with a large number of voters have been studied in the literature and the focus of this paper is on studying election with a large number of candidates. Manipulability, when the number of candidates is large, is significant in the context of computational social choice. Our investigation in this paper covers ...

This paper examines coalition formation problems from the viewpoint of mechanism design. We consider the case where (i) the list of feasible coalitions (those coalitions which are permitted to form) is given in advance; and (ii) each individual’s preference is a ranking over those feasible coalitions which include this individual. We are interested in requiring the mechanism to guarantee each c...

In a unified framework of allocation problems with at least three entities (or agents), we show that “generalized proportional rules” are the only rules that are robust to coalitional manipulations. We characterize proportional rules imposing in addition efficiency, dummy, and nonnegativity. Coalitional manipulations are considered both in the environment without any restriction on coalition fo...

In the obnoxious facility game, a location for an undesirable facility is to be determined based on the voting of selfish agents. Design of group strategy proof mechanisms has been extensively studied, but it is known that there is a gap between the social benefit (i.e., the sum of individual benefits) by a facility location determined by any group strategy proof mechanism and the maximum socia...