We study a buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value he does not know, but the seller cannot credibly reveal this value without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how the seller can appropriate a substantial fraction of the value through g...

We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how and why the seller can appropriate a su...

We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information itself. Information comes as divisible hard evidence. We show how and why the seller can appropriate a su...

This study suggests how an order-receiving company can avoid disclosing schedule information on unit tasks to the order-placing company when carrying out a collaborative project on the value chain in an order-oriented industry. Specifically, it suggests methods for keeping schedule information confidential, and categorizes potential situations by inter-task dependency. Lastly, an approach to se...

The Freedom of Information (FOI) Acts passed in 2000 in England and Wales and in 2002 in Scotland require organisations, including UK Higher Education Institutions (HEI), to provide requested information within certain conditions. The JISC Information Governance Gateway (JIGG) project aims to provide a single online gateway into information and resources related to HEIs’ compliance with informa...

In many types of information systems, users face an implicit tradeoff between disclosing personal information and receiving benefits, such as discounts by an electronic commerce service that requires users to divulge some personal information. While these benefits are relatively measurable, the value of privacy involved in disclosing the information is much less tangible, making it hard to desi...

I compare the value of information acquired secretly with information acquired openly prior to a first-price common-value auction. Novel information (informationwhich is independent of the other bidder’s private information) ismore valuable when learned openly, but redundant information (information the other bidder already has) is more valuable when learned covertly. In a dynamic game where a ...