This paper demonstrates by simulations, applied to the hawk dove game, evidence which favors the interface theory of perception. Multiple simulation built around the basic evolutionary hawk dove game, and asexual genetic/simulated annealing experiment upon the hawk dove game. The experiments and data are explained in the context of how the corroborate the interface theory of perception. Backgro...

S. J. van Enk and R. Pike in PRA 66, 024306 (2002), argue that the equilibrium solution to a quantum game isn’t unique but is already present in the classical game itself. In this work, we debunk this assertion by showing that a random strategy in a particular quantum (Hawk-Dove) game is unique to the quantum game. In other words the equilibrium solution of the quantum Hawk-Dove game can not be...

Vehicle routing problem is one of the most important issues in transportation. Among VRP problems, the competitive VRP is more important because there is a tough competition between distributors and retailers. In this study we introduced new method for VRP in competitive environment. In these methods Two-Person Nonzero Sum games are defined to choose equilibrium solution. Therefore, revenue giv...

We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. A variety of recent models gives the same predictions for this game. This allows us to provide a general classification of individuals’ types. Contrary to a large number of studies on different games over the last decade, we observe a large group of subjects behaving in a selfinterested and rational way in the Hawk-Dove game.

Hawk-dove games have been extensively used to predict the conditions under which group-living animals should defend their resources against potential usurpers. Typically, game-theoretic models on aggression consider that resource defense may entail energetic and injury costs. However, intruders may also take advantage of owners who are busy fighting to sneak access to unguarded resources, impos...

The model comprises three hierarchical levels: individual, population, and environment. Each individual is characterized by five state variables: (1) identity number; three heritable and evolving traits corresponding to (2) the probability h (0 ≤ ) to adopt the aggressive hawk behavior in the Hawk-Dove game; (3) in the scenario with binary physiological h ≤ 1 traits, the probability m ( ) to ad...

S. J. van Enk and R. Pike in PRA 66, 024306 (2002) argue that the equilibrium solution to a quantum game isn't unique but is already present classical itself. In this work, we contest assertion by showing random strategy particular (Hawk-Dove) game. other words, one cannot obtain of Hawk-Dove Moreover, provide an analytical $2\times2$ strategic form using randomly mixed strategies. The which de...

We study effects of additive spatiotemporal random variations, introduced to the payoffs of a spatial hawk–dove game, on the evolution of the reconciliatory and the aggressive strategy. We show that uncertainties facilitate aggressive behavior for a broad range of resource values. In particular, aggressors thrive best if stochastic influences are of the order of magnitude of deterministic payof...

This chapter surveys some evolutionary games used in biological sciences. These include the Hawk-Dove game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, Rock– Paper–Scissors, the war of attrition, the Habitat Selection game, predatorprey games, and signalling games.