This paper analyzes the response of international oil producers to demand-induced changes in the real price of oil during 1975–2011. The goal is to disentangle fluctuations in OPEC and non-OPEC production and to derive consistent estimates of the short-run price elasticity of crude oil supply at the country level. I find that oil producers hardly respond to demand shocks within the same month, ...

Abstract I n this paper, the behavior of the real oil price and OPEC and non-OPEC oil production during 1973-2013 are modelled. Interactions among OPEC, non-OPEC oil production, global oil consumption, and the real price of crude oil are estimated using a Structural VAR model (SVAR). After providing evidence for the structural breaks in oil price in 1996, the results indicate that, ac...

This paper estimates a dynamic model of the world oil market and tests whether OPEC countries colluded and whether non-OPEC countries behaved oligopolistically over the period 1970-2004. The model generates estimates of the shadow price of the resource with minimal functional form assumptions. Results support oligopolistic behavior among non-OPEC producers and collusion among OPEC producers exc...

a r t i c l e i n f o JEL classifications: C51 N70 Keywords: Crude oil price volatility GARCH Covariates Modified dummy variables OPEC announcements WTI crude oil Several times a year, OPEC hosts conferences among its members to agree on further oil production policies. Prior to OPEC conferences, there is usually rampant speculation about which decision concerning world oil production levels (n...

In this paper, we propose novel decision support system (DSS) named OPEC-DSS to support OPEC’s decisions on oil production level. OPEC-DSS is based on two important factors in oil prices; the first is OPEC oil production level (OPEC-PL) and the second is USA oil imports level (USA-IL). The OPEC-DSS support the analysers and decision-makers in three following issues: 1) OPEC-DSS can propose the ...

In November 2014, OPEC announced a new strategy geared towards improving its market share. Oil-market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher-cost producers, notably US shale oil, out of the market. Over the next year, crude oil prices crashed, with large repercussions for the global economy. We present a simple equilibrium model that explains the fundamental market factors th...

In November 2014, OPEC announced a new strategy geared towards improving its market share. Oil-market analysts interpreted this as an attempt to squeeze higher-cost producers including US shale oil out of the market. Over the next year, crude oil prices crashed, with large repercussions for the global economy. We present a simple equilibrium model that explains the fundamental market factors th...

The world oil market is modelled as a two-person non-zero-sum game in normal form with each player having a continuum of strategies. The two players are the oil importing nations (OPIC) and the oil exporting nations (OPEC). The game is solved in the noncooperative sense using the equilibrium point solution concept due to Nash. The Nash equilibrium point solution yields an analytic expression fo...

The energy shocks of the 1970's had significant effects on the global economy. Were they engineered by an effective cartel of OPEC members acting to share the market by controlling output and influencing market prices? If OPEC was an effective cartel sharing the market among its members, there would be a long-run relationship between each member's individual production and total OPEC output. On...

This study further develops a party to party gas price bargaining model (expanded in a research paper by Okugu, 2002) by using proxies of prices of these replacement fuels in OPEC spot oil prices and Henry Hub (HH) spot gas prices. The study finds a significant relationship between the variables. When optimally lagged data are analysed in a vector autoregressive model, a significant longer-term...