نتایج جستجو برای: Shapley vector

تعداد نتایج: 199675  

Journal: :Games and Economic Behavior 2012
Anindya De Ilias Diakonikolas Rocco A. Servedio

For f a weighted voting scheme used by n voters to choose between two candidates, the n Shapley-Shubik Indices (or Shapley values) of f provide a measure of how much control each voter can exert over the overall outcome of the vote. Shapley-Shubik indices were introduced by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 [SS54] and are widely studied in social choice theory as a measure of the “influen...

2014
Irinel Dragan

In the theory of cooperative transferable utilities games, (TU games), the Efficient Values, that is those which show how the win of the grand coalition is shared by the players, may not be a good solution to give a fair outcome to each player. In an earlier work of the author, the Inverse Problem has been stated and explicitely solved for the Shapley Value and for the Least Square Values. In t...

Journal: :Math. Meth. of OR 2006
Luisa Carpente Balbina Casas-Méndez Ignacio García-Jurado Anne van den Nouweland

In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The Shapley valuation function is defined using the lowervalue based method to associate coalitional games ...

2013
Koji Yokote

This paper shows a new axiomatization of the Shapley value by using two axioms. First axiom is Dummy Player Property and second axiom is Strong Addition Invariance. Strong Addition Invariance states that the payoff vector of a game does not change even if we add some specific games to the game. By slightly changing the definition of Strong Addition Invariance, we can also axiomatize the weighte...

2008
Irinel Dragan IRINEL DRAGAN

This paper is considering the problem of dividing fairly the worth of the grand coalition in a transferable utilities game, in case that the coalition is formed. The computational experience for the Shapley Value, the most famous solution, is extensive, but the case of the Weighted Shapley Value and that of the Kalai-Samet Value have been barely considered. Based upon some results connected to ...

Journal: :J. Economic Theory 2001
David Pérez-Castrillo David Wettstein

We propose a simple mechanism to determine how the surplus generated by cooperation is to be shared in zero-monotonic environments with transferable utility. The mechanism consists of a bidding stage followed by a proposal stage. We show that the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this mechanism coincide with the vector of the Shapley value payoffs. We extend our results to implement the w...

Journal: :Annals OR 2008
Justo Puerto Francisco R. Fernández Yolanda Hinojosa

In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a partially ordered linear space. Thus, the classical solution concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined: the core concept, Shapley–Bondareva theorem and the Shapley value are extended for this class of games. The classes of standard, vector-valued and stochastic cooperative gam...

D. S. Hooda Divya Jain, Pratibha Rani,

Interval-valued intuitionistic fuzzy set (IVIFS) has developed to cope with the uncertainty of imprecise human thinking. In the present communication, new entropy and similarity measures for IVIFSs based on exponential function are presented and compared with the existing measures. Numerical results reveal that the proposed information measures attain the higher association with the existing me...

2007
Fioravante Patrone Stef Tijs

In this note we study how far the theory of strategic games with potentials, as reported by Monderer and Shapley (Games Econ Behav 14:124–143, 1996), can be extended to strategic games with vector payoffs, as reported by Shapley (Nav Res Logist Q 6:57–61, 1959). The problem of the existence of pure approximate Pareto equilibria for multicriteria potential games is also studied.

Alparslan Gok, Sirma Zeynep, Olgun, Mehmet Onur, Palanci, Osman,

The Shapley value, one of the most common solution concepts of cooperative game theory is defined and axiomatically characterized in different game-theoretic models. Certainly, the Shapley value can be used in interesting sharing cost/reward problems in the Operations Research area such as connection, routing, scheduling, production and inventory situations. In this paper, we focus on the Shapl...

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