commercial companies are principally governed by majority rule. notwithstanding, mere application of this decision-making rule does not prevent conflict of interests between shareholders. such a conflict can be observed in three distinct hypotheses: 1- abuse committed by majority shareholders; 2- abuse committed by minority shareholders; 3- abuse committed by holders of equal shares. regardless...

majority rule has been a fundamental principle of corporate governance in the corporations and corporation laws of most countries including england and iran. according to it, shareholders who hold the majority of the corporate shares will take collective decisions in joint stock companies and once taken such decisions will bind the company and every company member even those who were in the min...

In the acquisition of listed corporation, the controlling shareholders who either hold a certain number of shares, or play a decisive role in the transfer of corporation control. Compared with the minority shareholders, controlling shareholders often abuse its dominant position to harm other stakeholders' interests of the corporation. Imposing the fiduciary duties to the controlling shareholder...

OBJECTIVE To describe the convicted and cautioned abusers and the nature of the physical and sexual abuse of children using a legal classification in an attempt to formulate operational criteria for future comparative studies. DESIGN A retrospective sequential survey of all cautioned and convicted physical and sexual abusers between the January 1, 1988 and June 30, 1994. SETTING The West Mi...

This paper incorporates a model of corporate control into a general equilibrium framework for production economies with incomplete markets. The classical objective of value maximization is extended, but is indeterminate. Instead, firms are viewed as being subject to shareholder control via some decision mechanism. As long as this decision mechanism is responsive to a unanimous preference by sha...

Article history: Received 5 January 2014 Received in revised form 12 October 2014 Accepted 13 October 2014 Available online 28 October 2014 As an alternative version of the side-payment model, this paper presents a demonstration of how the necessity of winning majority support of shareholders influences the relation between a blockholder's monitoring incentive and a firm's dividend policy. When...