commercial companies are principally governed by majority rule. notwithstanding, mere application of this decision-making rule does not prevent conflict of interests between shareholders. such a conflict can be observed in three distinct hypotheses: 1- abuse committed by majority shareholders; 2- abuse committed by minority shareholders; 3- abuse committed by holders of equal shares. regardless...

majority rule has been a fundamental principle of corporate governance in the corporations and corporation laws of most countries including england and iran. according to it, shareholders who hold the majority of the corporate shares will take collective decisions in joint stock companies and once taken such decisions will bind the company and every company member even those who were in the min...

In the acquisition of listed corporation, the controlling shareholders who either hold a certain number of shares, or play a decisive role in the transfer of corporation control. Compared with the minority shareholders, controlling shareholders often abuse its dominant position to harm other stakeholders' interests of the corporation. Imposing the fiduciary duties to the controlling shareholder...

Recent studies in Finance suggest dividends’ role as monitoring mechanism, which allows minority shareholders to control the managers or larger shareholders’ decisions. This paper tests this hypothesis on listed companies at Bucharest Stock Exchange, in 2000-2003 period, from the legislation perspective, but, also, using dividend ratios. Even the regulations and the enforcement of the law seem ...

This paper addresses the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This problem is common among public firms in many countries where the legal system does not effectively protect minority shareholders against oppression by controlling shareholders. We show that even without any explicit corporate governance mechanisms protecting minority shareholders, controllin...

much of the research on family firms is carried out in mature markets, a small but burgeoning literature has examined the role of family businesses in emerging markets characterised by an institutional void. We examine publicly listed family firms in Taiwan to shed light on a key debate: is family control beneficial because it fills the institutional void or is it harmful because it abuses it. ...

On December 15, 2010, after 11 months of legal standoff, the Swiss corporation Novartis finally closed a deal to acquire the remaining shares of eye-care company Alcon from minority shareholders. Why did it take almost a year? The acquisition had become a relatedparty transaction after Novartis purchased a 25% stake from then majority shareholder Nestlé and nominated some of its own directors t...