The Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf, and Deegan-Packel indices are three prominent power indices for measuring voters’ power in weighted voting games. We consider two methods of manipulating weighted voting games, called annexation and merging. These manipulations allow either an agent, called an annexer to take over the voting weights of some other agents, or the coming together of some agents to form...

Weighted voting games are classic cooperative games which provide a compact representation for coalition formation models in multiagent systems. We consider manipulation in weighted voting games via annexation and merging, which involves an agent or some agents misrepresenting their identities in anticipation of gaining more power at the expense of other agents in a game. We show that annexatio...

This paper discusses weighted voting games and two methods of manipulating those games, called annexation and merging. These manipulations allow either an agent, called an annexer to take over the voting weights of some other agents in the game, or the coming together of some agents to form a bloc of manipulators to have more power over the outcomes of the games. We evaluate the extent of susce...

The aim of this study is to shed some light on the historical evolution of the implementation of the adjacent area regulation in Turkey as a form of annexation practice with particular reference to both its role as a tool of party politics and the struggle between different levels of local government units, and also the inherent tension between the legislative and political processes. What is p...