We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency problem: CEOs have managed to capture the pay process so that they set their own pay, constrained somew...

This paper examines the joint hypotheses that firms set optimal levels for CEO incentives, and that firms and CEOs jointly correct deviations from these optimal levels through equity grants and CEO portfolio rebalancing. I investigate two equity-based CEO incentives, pay-forperformance sensitivity and risk-taking incentive. Pay-for-performance sensitivity is defined as the change in CEO wealth ...

Efficient market hypothesis predicts that capital markets are beset with cer-tain biases which result from wrong estimation, and negatively influence shareholders’ expectations for higher returns, which in turn affects invest-ment efficiency, financial constraints and corporate performance efficacy in competitive markets, and eventually mitigates firm value. The present study aims at examining ...

The CEO succession process is broken. Many companies have no meaningful succession plans, and few of the ones that do are happy with them. CEO tenure is shrinking; in fact, two out of five CEOs fail in their first 18 months. It isn't just that more CEOs are being replaced; it's that they're being replaced badly. The problems extend to every aspect of CEO succession: internal development program...

We analyze the effects of CEO education on CEO turnover (firing and replacement) and firm performance. Our primary interest is on the role that CEO education plays in a firm’s decision to replace its current CEO, the role that it plays in selecting a new CEO, and on whether CEO education significantly affects performance. We use six main measures of CEO education: whether or not the CEO attende...

This paper analyzes the role three personal traits—cognitive and non-cognitive ability, and height—play in the market for CEOs. We merge data on the traits of more than one million Swedish males, measured at age 18 in a mandatory military enlistment test, with comprehensive data on their income, education, profession, and service as a CEO of any Swedish company. We find that the traits of large...

We investigate the association between chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) marital status and their tendency to profit from insider trading. argue that marriage can constrain CEOs’ opportunistic behaviour, which could increase litigation risk, show married CEOs earn lower trading returns compared unmarried CEOs. Insider trades be identified as either routine or opportunistic. also find are less l...

BACKGROUND Controlling nuclear maturation during oocyte culture might improve nuclear-cytoplasmic maturation synchrony. In the present study, the quality of mouse and human cumulus-enclosed oocytes (CEOs) was examined after a two-step culture consisting of a three-dimensional prematuration culture (3D-PMC), followed by in vitro maturation (IVM). METHODS Mouse and human CEOs were embedded in a...

The order of authorship was determined alphabetically. We are grateful to Andrew Henderson, Monica Higgins, Timothy Pollock, Gerard Sanders, and seminar participants at the University of Texas at Austin for providing valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. We also thank Linda Johanson, Joseph Porac, and the anonymous ASO reviewers for their constructive feedback and suggestions. This...

*The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or the Federal Reserve System. Recently, there has been strong public outrage against current pay practices for corporate CEOs, regardver the past few years, there has been strong public outrage against current pay practices for corporate CEOs. To deal with th...