The simultaneous determination of financial default and political crises is studied in an open economy model. Political crises accompany default in equilibrium because of an information transmission conflict between the government and the public. Multiple equilibria are possible: if foreign lenders are pessimistic about the country’s stability, they demand a high interest on the debt, exacerbat...

Financial crises are linked to large output declines, but the potential links between different types of crises remains unclear. To enhance understanding we study the interdependencies between domestic banking crises, on one hand, and external financial crises, including currency and sudden stop crises, on the other in a quarterly global panel. We further ask how the different crises relate to ...

The abruptness and virulence of the 1997 Asian crises have led many to claim that these crises are of a new breed and thus they were unforecastable. This paper examines 102 financial crises in 20 countries and concludes that the Asian crises are not of a new variety. Overall, the 1997 Asian crises, as well as previous crises in other regions, occur when the economies are in distress, making the...

The economic literature emphasised the role of strategic complementarities in generating banking crises and currency crises. Motivated by evidence from recent financial crises, we study a model, where strategic complementarities exist, not only within a group of creditors or within a group of currency speculators, but also between the two groups. The additional type of complementarities generat...

PBE Type i: Neither default nor political crisis If V ≤ χL, the costs of default are always larger than the costs of servicing the debt even for the benevolent government. Then in equilibrium, the government proposes to service the debt, which is accepted by the representative agent. Hence the debt is repaid and political crisis is avoided. Neither the benevolent government nor the self interes...

a r t i c l e i n f o This study aims to identify which factors explain why some countries enjoy long durations of stability, while others experience crises in shorter intervals. We analyze the duration of stability periods between currency, debt, and banking crises by employing an innovative econometric strategy, the Finite Mixture Model (FMM). Real and financial variables show high predictive...

Executive Summary Currency crises tend to be regional. Since macroeconomic and financial phenomena are not regional, these phenomena are unimportant in understanding why crises spread. But international trade is regional, as countries tend to trade with their neighbors. This suggests that trade links are important in understanding how currency crises spread, above and beyond any macroeconomic p...