Recent academic investigations of computer security policy violations have largely focused on non-malicious noncompliance due to poor training, low employee motivation, weak affective commitment, or individual oversight. Established theoretical foundations applied to this domain have related to protection motivation, deterrence, planned behavior, self-efficacy, individual adoption factors, orga...

The paper explores the deterrent effect of punitive damages when capital investment is endogenous to the legal rule. Irrespective of the level of damages, firms can reduce their expected liabilities by either increasing safety (the law’s intended goal) or reducing wealth exposed to liability. We show that punitive damages can exacerbate this wealth reduction effect and thereby reduce deterrence...

This article studies the implications for the theory of deterrence of (a) the manner in which individuals’ disutility from imprisonment varies with the length of the imprisonment term and (b) discounting of the future disutility and future public costs of imprisonment. Two questions are addressed: Is deterrence enhanced more by increasing the length of imprisonment terms or instead by raising t...

Reducing Gang Violence Using Focused Deterrence: Evaluating the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV) Robin S. Engel , Marie Skubak Tillyer & Nicholas Corsaro To cite this article: Robin S. Engel , Marie Skubak Tillyer & Nicholas Corsaro (2013) Reducing Gang Violence Using Focused Deterrence: Evaluating the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV), Justice Quarterly, 30:3, 403-...

Because punishment is scarce, costly, and painful, optimal enforcement strategies will minimize the amount of actual punishment required to effectuate deterrence. If potential offenders are sufficiently deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce the amount of punishment actually inflicted, by "tipping" a situation from its high-violation equili...

In liberalized network industries, competitors can either compete for service using the existing infrastructure (access) or deploy their own capacity (bypass). We revisit this make-or-buy problem making two contributions to the literature. First we analyze both the profit maximizing behavior of an incumbent and the welfare maximizing behavior when the entrant chooses between access and bypass. ...

We study a model where capacity installation by an incumbent firm serves to deter others from entering the industry. We argue that uncertainty about demand or costs forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity level than it would under certainty. This higher level diminishes the attractiveness of deter rence (Proposition 1) and, therefore, the range of parameter values for which deterrence ...

Leamer and McManus applied Extreme Bound Analysis (EBA) in an empirical study of the deterrent effects of capital punishment and other penalties. Their analysis has questioned the validity of the deterrence hypothesis. The thrust of our paper is two-fold: First, by applying EBA to well known econometric models of demand, production, and human-capital investment, our analysis exposes and illustr...

The enforcement of information security policy is an important issue in organisations. Previous studies approach policy enforcement using deterrence theory to deal with information security violations and focus on end-users’ awareness. This study investigates deterrence strategy within organisations from the perspective of information security managers. The results primarily reveal that current...