We discuss and examine empirically a firm-level equivalent of the ancient problem of ‘tying the King’s hands’, namely how to avoid managerial intervention that is undertaken to reap private benefits but is harmful to overall value creation, that is, ‘managerial opportunism’. The link from managerial intervention to firm-level value-creation is moderated by employee motivation. Thus, interventio...

We propose a novel approach to evaluating the empirical importance of individual managerial characteristics: We analyze different managerial positions (CEO and CFO) jointly and ask whether a managerial bias (overconfidence) matters for decisions under the control of the manager, but not for decisions outside the manager’s core duties. Using a new data set on CEO and CFO overconfidence, we show ...

This document lists relevant literature for the DSTC Spectrum project on Trust Management in Open Computer Networks. 1 The Concept of Trust

Much of the evidence on managerial biases in corporate finance focuses CEO and, particular, overconfidence. This singular focus can lead to misattribution as it ignores roles other managers who are responsible for a given outcome. We evaluate influence CFO and C-suite executives compared with CEO. Mirroring widely used Longholder measure overconfidence, we construct Other measures. For financin...

this study investigates empirically the value investors place in excess cash holdingand how managerial ability impact on the value of cash holding for iranianfirms from 2006 to 2014. in this research, managerial ability calculated by usingthe data envelopment analysis (dea). following the approach of faulkender andwang, we find that the relation between managerial ability and value of cash hold...