with the publication of the first book by menger, the austrian school was established in 1871. while different factors such as migration of the austrian scholars to foreign countries and focus on market mechanisms against the ideas of down drift from crisis led to the decline of this school in 1930s, it reemerged in 1970s due to the same factors, too. the purposes in this research– by using lib...

The Reflexive-Intentional Model of the Subject (RIMS) connects the subject’s bipolar probabilistic behavior with its mental domain. We demonstrate that the Matching Law is a formal consequence of this tie. RIMS allows us also to deduce theoretically the main patterns of animal behavior in the experiments with two alternatives where the Matching Law reveals itself. This finding inclines us to pu...

For need a term, and want of a better term, I have labeled this metatheory “mentalism” to suggest a focus on that aspect of mental activity given to us in any waking moment—consciousness. Mentalism proposes an analysis of mental episodes that can reveal lawfulness among those conscious states. Consciousness may symbolically represent a present out there in perception, a past in forms of remembr...

Michael Bergmann seeks to motivate his externalist, proper function theory of epistemic justification by providing three objections to the mentalism and mentalist evidentialism characteristic of nonexternalists such as Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. Bergmann argues that (i) mentalism is committed to the false thesis that justification depends on mental states; (ii) mentalism is committed to th...

Central to the project of Smithies’s excellent The Epistemic Role Consciousness (2019) is a doctrine he calls mentalism, that ‘epistemic justification depends solely on your mental states, rather than reliability their connections external world’ (193). That by no means trivial thesis. However, it does not pin down what distinctive synoptic theory epistemology and philosophy mind. Someone quite...

The target paper’s main point is that mentalism and, to this extent, mentalistic (e.g., cognitive) psychology can only be materialistic and, hence, cannot be dualistic. The commentaries to the paper are insightful and stimulating. A few call for corrections, the rest for further clarification. Most criticize the mind-brain identity theory. This criticism is beside the point, as I did not intend...