Humans are a coalitional, parochial species. Yet, extreme actions of solidarity are sometimes taken for distant or unrelated groups. What motivates people to become solidary with groups to which they do not belong originally? Here, we demonstrate that such distant solidarity can occur when the perceived treatment of an out-group clashes with one's political beliefs (e.g., for Leftists, oppressi...

Political elite’s relations for maintaining power is an important key to analyse the government’s behaviour. This paper presents a new network policy among the Iranian political elite using Social Network Analysis Method. How do they make the network? Is there Elite to Elite family relation based on ideological united or common interests? Network boundary is the political elites who have kinshi...

political islam is the only active religion discourse in the world claiming to have program for religion and the muslim world and to achieve this goal it must gain political power. from its existence the dialogue has triggered different experiences in islamic countries. the most important victory of the islamic revolution in iran in 1979 and egypt's muslim brotherhood movement was to seize...

We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and pro…le of political dynasties, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We …nd that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are signi…cantly more li...

The frequent and peaceful transition of power is often taken as the sign of a healthy democracy. Yet alternating power is not without cost, most notably from the time-inconsistency of policy making that is induced. In this paper I offer a novel argument in favor of alternating political power, showing how the transition of power between ideologically opposed parties can per se benefit voters. T...

We study the constrained Pareto efficient allocations in a dynamic production economy in which the group that holds political power decides the allocation of resources. We show that Pareto efficient allocations take a quasi-Markovian structure and can be represented recursively as a function of the identity of the group in power and updated Pareto weights. For high discount factors, the economy...

In a canonical model of sequential collective bargaining over a divisible good we show that equilibrium expected payoffs are not restricted by players’ voting rights or their impatience. For all monotonic voting rules and discount factors, and for all divisions of the good among players, there exists a stationary proposal-making rule such that this division represents players’ expected payoffs ...