Trust is multi-dimensional because it can be characterized by subjective trust, trust antecedent, and behavioral trust. Previous research has investigated functional brain responses to subjective trust (e.g., a judgment of trustworthiness) or behavioral trust (e.g., decisions to trust) in perfect information, where all relevant information is available to all participants. In contrast, we condu...

We show in a sender-receiver game with strictly opposing interests that rewards enhance trust but do not influence truth-telling. Subjects who reward tend to tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of reward opportunities. The amount of obtained rewards thereby enhances truth-telling. JEL Classification: C72, C73, D83.

background and objectives: most physicians believe that telling lies and withholding the truth is not permissible. however, it appears that holding the phenomenon telling the truth to be absolute or unconditional is not acceptable either. this study was conducted to examine qom city physicians’ attitudes with regard to revealing the influential news to patients. methods: this was a descriptive-...

Young children understand that lying is wrong, yet little is known about the emotions children connect to the acts of lying and confessing and how children's emotion expectancies relate to real-world behavior. In the current study, 4- to 9-year-old children (N=48) heard stories about protagonists (a) committing transgressions, (b) failing to disclose their misdeeds, and (c) subsequently lying o...

Herein we explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment via a truth-telling oath can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic sequential coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap-talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment-via-the-oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) sende...

We propose an alternative market design to the current credit ratings industrial organization. An issuer delegates a pass-through non-monitoring trust to acquire ratings from credit ratings agencies (CRAs). The trust pays outcome contingent fees, such that truth-telling is incentive compatible for CRAs, eliminating ratings inflation. Moreover, because the trust acts as an intermediary, it elimi...

A difficult case study involving repeated health crises and irreversible organ dysfunction illustrates the challenges critical care professionals face in caring for patients and their families. In such cases, trust is especially fragile, and coexists with its counterpart, betrayal. The Reina Trust & Betrayal Model defines 3 types of Transactional Trust. The first, Competence Trust, or the Trust...

We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the impact of institutions and institutional choice on truth-telling and trust in sender-receiver games. We find that in an institution with sanctioning opportunities, receivers sanction predominantly after having trusted lies. Individuals who sanction are responsible for truth-telling beyond standard equilibrium predictions and are more likely ...

We describe a pricing structure for the provision of IT services that ensures trust without requiring repeated interactions between service providers and users. It does so by offering a pricing structure that elicits truthful reporting of QoS by providers while making them profitable. This mechanism also induces truth-telling on the part of users reserving the service.