This paper investigates how competitive cyber-insurers affect network security and welfare of the networked society. In our model, a user’s probability to incur damage (from being attacked) depends on both his security and the network security, with the latter taken by individual users as given. First, we consider cyberinsurers who cannot observe (and thus, affect) individual user security. Thi...

We consider a collision channel, shared by a finite number of self-interested users with heterogenous throughput demands. It is assumed that each user transmits with a fixed probability at each time slot, and the transmission is successful if no other user transmits simultaneously. Each user is interested in adjusting its transmission rate so that its throughput demand is met. When throughput r...

User equilibrium with recourse (UER) is a static traffic assignment equilibrium model. The model accounts for the adaptive behaviour of users when provided additional information en-route within a transport network. Similar to the traditional deterministic user equilibrium (DUE) model, this equilibrium model analytically exhibits what is known as the “Braess Paradox”. The paradox suggests that ...

We develop a novel auction-based algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use the second-price auction mechanism whereby user bids for the channel, during each time-slot, based on the fade state of the channel, and the user that makes the higher bid wins use of the channel by paying the second highest bid. Under the assumption that each user has a limited bud...

The theory of super network is an effective method to various traffic networks with means of multiple decision-making. It provides us with a favorable pricing decision tool for it combines a practical transport network with the space pricing decision. Spatial price equilibrium problem has always been the important research direction of the Transport Economics and regional transportation plannin...