in this study, the social welfare impacts of the interaction of iranian rice import policies and thai export policies are analyzed using a game theoretic approach in conjunction with econometric supply and demand models. the joint impacts of increasing the world price of rice, resulting from the export policies in thailand along with changes in tariff rates in iran, on social welfare are analyz...

In this paper, I analyze consumption, aggregate savings,output and welfare implications of …ve di¤erent social security arragements whenever there is demographic uncertanity. Following Bohn(2002), I analyze the e¤ect of an uncetain population growth in an extended version of a modi…ed Life-cycle model developed by Gertler(1999). Population growth dampens savings and output under all arrangement...

We study antitrust enforcement in which the fine must obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. We integrate these legal principles into an infinitely-repeated oligopoly model. Bankruptcy considerations ensure abnormal cartel profits. We derive the optimal fine schedule that achieves maximal social welfare under ...

Being excluded and ignored has been shown to threaten fundamental human needs and cause pain. Such reflexive reactions to social exclusion have been conceptualized as direct and unmoderated (temporal need threat model, Williams, 2009). Here we propose an extension and argue that reflexive reactions depend on how social exclusion situations are construed. If being excluded is understood as a vio...

This paper investigates how the formation of larger buyers affects a supplier’s profits and, by doing so, his incentives to undertake non-contractible activities. We first identify two channels of buyer power, which allows larger buyers to obtain discounts. We subsequently examine the effects of buyer power on the supplier’s incentives and on social welfare. Contrary to some informal claims in ...

We construct an algebraic model of the social choice theory. First we give an arithmetic proof of Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. Next we apply our algebraic method to single-peaked preference domain to establish two theorems. (i) A value of Arrovian social welfare function on single peaked preference domain is single-plateaued with at most two maximal elements. (ii) An ordering by majority voti...

We study mechanisms where a player’s strategy is one of his possible (payoff) types and at least one player is Knightian, that is, cannot distinguish which element of a “candidate set” with multiple types is his true type. We call such a mechanism Knightian truthful if, in all its rational plays, every player reports his own true type, if he knows it exactly, and a type in his candidate set, if...