BACKGROUND The use of preference-elicitation tasks for valuing health states is well established, but little is known about whether these preferences are informed. Preferences may not be informed because individuals with little experience of ill health are asked to value health states. The use of uninformed preferences in cost-effectiveness can result in sub-optimal resource allocation. The aim...

This paper shows that information effects per se are not responsible for the Gi®en goods anomaly affecting competitive traders’ demands in multi-asset, noisy rational expectations equilibrium models. The role that information plays in traders’ strategies also matters. In a market with risk averse, uninformed traders, informed agents have a dual motive for trading: speculation and market making....

We consider a private value auction with one-sided incomplete information in which two objects are sold sequence of second-price auctions. Buyers have multi-unit demands and both asymmetrically informed at the ex-ante stage game. One buyer perfectly knows his type other is uninformed about own type. con-sider interim acquisition for derive an asymmetric equilibrium shown to produce declining pr...

We present a model in which investors observe the same macroeconomic data but have varying levels of information about the parameters that determine the distribution of the expected returns on investment. During a crisis that increases macroeconomic uncertainty and reduces asset prices, the threshold required return that triggers investment is lower for an informed investor than for an uninform...

We show in detail that the Parikh-Wilczek tunneling method (PWTM), which was designed for resolving the information loss problem in Hawking radiation (HR) fails whenever the radiation occurs from an isothermal process. The PWTM aims to produce a non-thermal HR which adumbrates the resolution of the problem of unitarity in quantum mechanics (QM), and consequently the entropy (or information) con...

This paper studies multiunit common value auctions with informed and less informed bidders. In these auctions, we show that bidders with less information can bid very aggressively and do surprisingly well. We also show that the degree of aggressiveness and success of bidders with less information is positively related to the number of units for sale. We explain these phenomena in terms of the b...

The recent experimental results of Plott and Sunder (1982) and Friedman, Harrison and Salmon (1983) on the ability of single commodity markets to "reveal" the underlying state to initially uninformed traders were potentially influenced by a design in which the set of informed traders was held constant throughout the life of the market. Hence the performance of uninformed traders in the market m...