Abstract This article looks at the question of whether and how there can be a theistic expansive naturalism. In light Fiona Ellis's work, I will identify crucial issue for this research programme moving forward, namely, ‘which God?’. Ellis seeks to develop metaphysical framework that offers rationale incorporating theism into naturalism, acceptance God comes through reflection on our relation v...

In their paper “Should Methodological Naturalists Commit to Metaphysical Naturalism?” Zargar et al. try show that the correct answer question title of poses is positive. They argue methodological naturalism has a metaphysical presupposition, namely causal closure, and an epistemological consequence, evidentialism. Causal closure evidentialism imply naturalism. Thus, they conclude, one who belie...

Much work in ontology has been based on ideas derived explicitly from philosophy. In particular there are two philosophy-based high-level ontologies which have been used to analyse tools and techniques for designing information systems, both deriving from the tradition of realism – one from naturalism (Bunge), the other from Aristotelian common-sense realism (Chisholm). Does it matter which und...

code). All of this evidence gives suggestive empirical support to the notion that manipulating concepts -including applying them to examples -involves perception-related cognition, which clashes with the classical picture of non-experiential, a priori cognition.

Don Cupitt’s version of religious non-realism based as it is on linguistic constructivism, radical relativism and the view that culture forms human nature has been attacked with devastating effect by realists in the last few years. I argue that there is another strand in Cupitt’s thinking, his biological naturalism, that supports a different version of religious non-realism and that he failed t...

In Coming to Our Senses (1996), I argue for and apply a naturalistic semantic methodology to defend an anti-holistic truth-referential view of meaning. The naturalism in question is an epistemological doctrine that I take from Quine: there is only one way of knowing, the empirical way that is the basis of science (whatever that way may be). So I reject “a priori knowledge.” I do not give a deta...