Americans learn about free parking early, when they play Monopoly. Players buy property, build houses and hotels, pay rent, or go to jail at a toss of the dice – but in one toss out of 40 they land on "Free Parking." When they grow up and drive cars, the odds of landing on free parking increase dramatically; American motorists park free for 99 percent of all their trips. If motorists don't pay ...

Brief digestion of ox neurofilaments with trypsin liberates fragments that are soluble and have molecular weights ranging from 164 000 to 97 000. Peptide fingerprinting indicates that these regions, termed the tryptic head-regions, arise from the 205 000- and 158 000-mol.wt. components of the triplet. The remains of the parent polypeptides sediment with normal filaments and have been termed tai...

This study compares an ordered probit model and a Tobit model with selection to take into account both true zero and protest zero bids while estimating the willingness to pay (WTP) for coi~servation easements in Macon County, NC. By comparing the two models, the ordere~Uunordered selection issue of the protest responses is analyzed to demonstrate how the treatment of protest responses can signi...

This paper measures the extent to which medical groups experience external pay-for-performance incentives based on quality and patient satisfaction and the extent to which these groups pay their primary care and specialist physicians using similar criteria. Over half (52%) of large medical groups received bonus payments from health insurance plans in the period 2006-2007 based on measures of qu...

We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency problem: CEOs have managed to capture the pay process so that they set their own pay, constrained somew...

W investigate whether public opinion influences the level and structure of executive compensation. During 1992–2008, the negativity of press coverage of chief executive officer (CEO) pay varied significantly, with stock options being the most criticized pay component. We find that after more negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option grants and increase less contentious types of pa...

Using financial incentives, we study how portfolio choice (how much to invest in a risky asset) depends on three well-known behavioral phenomena: ambiguity aversion, the illusion of control, and myopic loss aversion. We find evidence that these phenomena are present and test how the level of investment is affected by these motivations; at the same time, we investigate whether participants are w...

We present new comparable data on the incidence of performance pay schemes in Europe and the USA. We find that the percentage of employees exposed to incentive pay schemes ranges from around 10-15 percent in some European countries to over 40 percent in Scandinavian countries and the US. Individual pay and profit/gain sharing schemes are widely diffused, whereas share ownership schemes are much...