It is well documented in the literature that inadequacy of the analytical models has been a primary reason for the low economic stability of deregulated power industry. Some of the modeling inadequacies can be attributed to the difficulties of analyzing nonzero sum multiplayer stochastic games that are inherent in deregulated power market operations. This paper presents a two-tier game theoreti...

This study proposes a novel option-revenue sharing coordination contract framework. In the proposed model, the retailer determines the number of order sales effort. The manufacturer sets the price of products for the wholesale strategy. The investigated supply chain problem analyzes the results of different strategies. In the proposed coordination contract problem, two types of games including ...

This paper presents a novel approach for evaluating impacts of price-sensitive loads on electricity price and market power. To accomplish this aim an analytical method along with agent-based computational economics are used. At first, Nash equilibrium is achieved by computational approach of Q-learning then based on the optimal bidding strategies of GenCos, which are figured out by Q-learning, ...

Most US consumers are charged a near-constant retail price for electricity, despite substantial hourly variation in the wholesale market price. The Smart Grid is a set of emerging technologies that will facilitate "real-time pricing" for electricity and increase price elasticity of demand. This paper simulates the e¤ects of this increased demand elasticity using counterfactual simulations in a ...

We study the online learning problem of a bidder who participates in repeated auctions. With the goal of maximizing his total T-period payoff, the bidder wants to determine the optimal allocation of his fixed budget among his bids for K different goods at each period. As a bidding strategy, we propose a polynomial time algorithm, referred to as dynamic programming on discrete set (DPDS), which ...

We study the use of auction algorithm in allocating a wireless fading channel among a set of non-cooperating users in both downlink and uplink communication scenarios. For the downlink case, we develop a novel auction-based algorithm to allow users to fairly compete for a wireless fading channel. We use the all-pay auction mechanism whereby user bid for the channel, during each time-slot, based...

We consider auctions in which greedy algorithms, paired with first-price or critical-price payment rules, are used to resolve multi-parameter combinatorial allocation problems. We study the price of anarchy for social welfare in such auctions. We show for a variety of equilibrium concepts, including Bayes-Nash equilibrium, low-regret bidding sequences, and asynchronous best-response dynamics, t...

This paper proves that the monotonicity of bidding strategies together with the rationality of bidders implies that the winning bid in a first price auction converges to the competitive equilibrium price as the number of bidders increases (Wilson (1977)). Instead of analyzing the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we examine rationalizable strategies (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)) among the set o...

abstract: the main goal of this paper is to modeling of producers’ strategic suggestions for each electricity manufacturer in an oligopolistic structure. according to the proposed structure of the electricity market modeling; this paper uses a dynamic model based on cournot equilibrium. due to the large volume of required information, the implementation of the model is limited to a regional ele...