To measure the benefits of formal contract enforcement for society, I create a market with merchants and buyers, in which buyers can choose whether to buy, pay. A set multiple “state‐favored” ethnic groups control state. experimentally vary contracts are required composition buyer‐merchant pairs. The design separately identifies effect on buyers' incentive pay their buy. document two ways socie...

This paper examines the economic role of the merchant coalition (kabu nakama) in Japan during the the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth century in Japan. During this period public sector enforcement of contracts was imperfect. Kabu nakama substituted for the public sector, using a multilateral punishment strategy. When the government (Bakufu) prohibited kabu nakama in 1841, the gr...

this paper investigates the relationship between earnings management and quality of earnings for the bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms listed in the tehran stock exchange from 2007 to 2012.the earnings quality  is measured by four separate accounting-based earnings attributes: accruals quality, earnings persistence, earnings predictability; earnings and is also examined by testing the relationshi...

C with suppliers prone to default is an increasingly common problem in some industries, particularly automotive manufacturing. We model this phenomenon as a two-period contracting game with two identical suppliers, a single buyer, deterministic demand, and uncertain production costs. The suppliers are distressed at the start of the game and do not have access to external sources of capital; hen...

Commodity merchants use real option models to manage their operations. A central element of such a model is its underlying operating policy. We focus on network contracts for the transport capacity of natural gas pipelines, specific energy conversion assets. Practitioners commonly manage these contracts as portfolios of spread options. Although computationally fast, we show that this approach i...