This paper presents the formulation of a new concept dealing with a Robust Stackelberg equilibrium for a multi scenario or mutiple models of a linear affine-quadratic game. The game dynamic is given by a family of N different possible differential equations (MultiModel representation) with no information about the trajectory which is realized. The robust Stackelberg strategy for each player mus...

Stackelberg differential game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in diverse fields. In this paper, we survey recent applications of Stackelberg differential game models to the supply chain management and marketing channels literatures. A common feature of these applications is the specification of the game structure: a decentralized channel compose...

Here we present a ground-breaking new postulate for game theory. The first part of this postulate contains the axiomatic observation that all games are created by a designer, whether they are: e.g., (dynamic/static) or (stationary/non-stationary) or (sequential/one-shot) non-cooperative games, and importantly, whether or not they are intended to represent a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, the...

This paper considers advertising, collection and pricing decisions simultaneously for a closed-loop supplychain(CLSC) with one manufacturer(he) and two retailers(she). A multiplicatively separable new demand function is proposed which influenced by pricing and advertising. In this paper, three well-known scenarios in the game theory including the Nash, Stackelberg and Cooperative games are expl...

The government organizations grant incentives to promote green product consumption, improve green product quality, boost remanufacturing activities, etc. through various policies. The objective of this study is to highlight pros and cons of two incentive policies, namely (1) incentive on manufacturer’s R&D investment and (2) direct incentive to consumer based on greening level of the product on...

This paper studies a class of dynamic Stackelberg games under open-loop information structure with constrained linear agent dynamics and quadratic utility functions. We show two important properties for this class of dynamic Stackelberg games. First, we prove that under mild conditions, the optimal control of individual agents at the solution of the Stackelberg game coincides with the solution ...

In this paper, greening, pricing, and advertising policies in a supply chain will be examined with government intervention. The supply chain has two members. First, a manufacturer seeking to determine the wholesale price and the greening level and second, a retailer that has to determine the advertising cost and the retail price. The government is trying to encourage the manufacturer to green t...

Gen_spectrum=Generic_1nm_Interpolation(Input_Spectrum, Method=’Cubic Splines’) First_filt_step=Filter_Boxcar(Gen_Spectrum, boxcar_length=’10% of Gen_spectrum’) Second_filt_step=Filter_Boxcar(First_filt_step, boxcar_length=’10% of Gen_spectrum’) Third_filt_step=Filter_Boxcar(Gen_Spectrum, boxcar_length=’2% of Gen_spectrum’) Fourth_filt_step=Filter_Boxcar(Third_filt_step, boxcar_length=’2% of Gen...

This paper studies equilibrium incentives in a vertically differentiated duopoly with price competition. We analyze one simultaneous-move game and two sequential-move games. In a simultaneous-move game, firms' managers determine their prices simultaneously in the first stage of the game and in the second stage two firms determine incentive schemes. One sequential-move game considers the case in...