In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 55 (1988), 71 84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee (Econometrica 61 (1993), 12...

This paper aims to show investigations made in knowledge e-marketplaces (Ke-markets). It gathers, reviews, structures, and compiles in a homogeneous presentation information of the current state of the art in knowledge marketplaces and trading. This work also aims to give an overview of the e-marketplace evolution, with a particular consideration of the knowledge marketplace, making a survey of...

We consider the problem of a monopolist with an object to sell before some deadline, facing n buyers with independent private values. The monopolist posts prices but has no commitment power. We show that the monopolist can always secure at least the larger of the static monopoly profit and the revenue from a Dutch auction with a zero reserve price. When there are only a few buyers, her profits ...

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing. Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all? We find that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense that it is restricted to only one side of the market (buyers or sellers). D 2006 Elsevier B.V. All r...

We show that loyalty discounts create an externality among buyers even without economies of scale or downstream competition, and whether or not buyers make any commitment. Each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. We prove that, provided the entrant’s cost advantage is not too large, with enough buyers, this externality implies that i...

Price is the omnipresent factor that determines buyers’ and sellers’ decision-making when trading products in real and virtual marketplaces. However, since a fixed price can often lead to unsuccessful transactions, in practice market players normally have price ranges in their minds, which imply some concessions when finding potential buyer-seller matches. In this paper, we propose a price-rang...

We consider loyalty discounts whereby the seller promises to give buyers who commit to buy from it a lower price than the seller gives to uncommitted buyers. We show that an incumbent seller can use loyalty discounts to soften price competition between itself and a rival, which raises market prices to all buyers. Each individual buyer’s agreement to a loyalty discount externalizes most of the h...