Economic theory traditionally supports the viewpoint that government ownership is inefficient and that privatization invariably leads to efficiency improvements. However, there is often frequent opposition to privatization activity because it is difficult to examine and empirically validate the effects of privatization. This is the first study to examine the impact of the privatization of posta...

at present, new tendencies in international commercial arbitration try to delocalize and gives more independence to arbitration, from national laws. the ultimate degree of this independency is demonstrated in lex mercatoria theory. in recent years this theory has been gone beyond the frontiers of pure theory and entered into the national laws of some countries such as netherlands, france and in...

fork in the road clauses and waiver clauses in investment treaties are supposed to minimize the number of parallel proceedings in foreign investment disputes. while, fork in the road clauses preclude investors from further litigation or arbitration once the first dispute settlement mechanism is triggered, in waiver clauses, domestic litigation can be followed by treaty arbitration regarding the...

This paper is the first paper to present findings evaluating the consequences for employees of full and partial privatization using difference-in-differences combined with propensity score matching. We find: (1) partial privatization causes job creation in contrast to full privatization, which destroys jobs, (2) full privatization causes higher labor productivity improvement than partial privat...

for decades, the approach of legal systems towards private arbitration in competition law has been characterized by a certain mistrust or suspicion. initially, this attitude may somehow have been linked to the uncertainty as to the arbitrability of competition law issues, in view of the fact that, in competition law matters generally, public interests are heavily at stake. in fact arbitration i...

We examine a game theory model of arbitration that generalizes previous models of both Final Offer Arbitration and Conventional Arbitration, and thereby enables a direct comparison of the two procedures. The model assumes there is a single quantifiable issue in dispute between two risk averse disputants. We analyze the relative range between the disputants' equilibrium offers and find that fina...

We propose an arbitration model framework that generalizes many previous quantitative models of final offer arbitration, conventional arbitration, and some proposed alternatives to them. Our model allows the two disputants to be risk averse and assumes that the issue(s) in dispute can be summarized by a single quantifiable value. We compare the performance of the different arbitration procedure...

This article draws some general connections between privatization and political accountability. Although the main focus of the article is to examine different types of privatization, specifically exploring the ramifications for political accountability of each type, I also engage in some speculation as to whether there are situations in which privatization might raise constitutional concerns re...