In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria. Two information structures are equivalent from the perspective of a modeler, if they induce the same equilibrium outcomes. We cha...

Unlike in the traditional theory of games of incomplete information, the players here are not Bayesian, i.e. a player does not necessarily have any prior probability distribution as t o what game is being played. The game is infinitely repeated. A player may be absolutely uninformed, i.e. he may know only how many strategies he has. However, after each play the player is informed about his payo...

We characterize a monopolist’s optimal offer of service plans when only some subscribers know their demand (type) already at the contracting stage, while others may learn their demand (type) only after incurring some costs, if at all. While informed customers purchase simpler tariffs, those who are still uninformed purchase tariffs that subsequently allow them to more flexibly adjust their cons...

Objective
 Human Papillomavirus (HPV) is the causative agent
 of cervical cancer. However, disease can be
 prevented by vaccination. In this study, we aimed to
 evaluate level knowledge about HPV vaccination
 among women who applied to gynecology outpatient
 clinics in Kars, Turkey.
 Materials and Methods
 This cross-sectional study included were
 ad...

Experimental evidence has consistently confirmed the ability of uninformed traders, even novices, to infer information from the trading process. After contrasting brain activation in subjects watching markets with and without insiders, we hypothesize that Theory of Mind (ToM) helps explain this pattern, where ToM refers to the human capacity to discern malicious or benevolent intent. We find th...