We extend the standard, one-period model of tax evasion to an intertemporal framework in which an expected-utility-maximizing taxpayer updates expectations about the probability of a future audit based on past audit experience. This framework provides a theoretical grounding for the empirical evidence indicating that tax evasion is affected by taxpayers' perceptions of audit probabilities and i...

We show that an increase in uncertainty about the probability of being audited (ambiguity) increases tax compliance for ambiguity-averse taxpayers but reduces compliance for ambiguity lovers. Because experimental evidence reveals considerable heterogeneity with respect to ambiguity preferences, we conclude that fostering uncertainty about the probability of being audited may not be an effective...

This paper uses a panel of individual tax returns and the ‘bracket creep’ as source of tax rate variation to construct instrumental variables estimates of the sensitivity of income to changes in tax rates. From 1979 to 1981, the US income tax schedule was fixed in nominal terms while inflation was high (around 10%). This produced a real change in tax rate schedules. Taxpayers near the top-end o...

The absence of a competitive market may enable public-sector workers to extract rents from taxpayers in the form of high pay, especially when public-sector workers are unionized. On the other hand, this rent extraction may be suppressed by the ability of taxpayers to vote with their feet, leaving jurisdictions where public-sector workers extract high rents. However, although migration of taxpay...

We consider the original Arrow-Lind framework in which a government undertakes a risky project to be shared among many taxpayers. In our model, the taxpayers decide the level of participation in the risky project. Moreover, the amount of taxes collected by the government fully finances the public project. In this case, we show that projects cannot be evaluated only on the basis of expected bene...

The paper studies the popular hypothesis that ”hiding” taxes from taxpayers, such as by nominally dividing the payroll tax between employees and employers, leads to higher taxes. To test the hypothesis, I analyze payroll taxes and pension spending in a sample of 89 countries and find that countries where employers nominally pay a higher share of the payroll tax tend to have lower taxes and smal...

We generalize the classic Allingham and Sandmo’s model of tax evasion considering heterogeneous agents with different degrees of tax morale and matchable, as opposed to non-matchable, income. The Tax Agency evolves its control scheme, maximizing the revenues from fines, and takes into account some minimal information on the taxpayers. We compare different audit policies and find that the most e...

Tax compliance has been studied in economics by analysing the individual decision of a representative person between paying and evading taxes. A neglected aspect of tax compliance is the interaction of taxpayers and tax authorities. The relationship between the two actors can be understood as an implicit or "psychological" contract. Studies on tax evasion in Switzerland show that the more stron...