This paper analyzes the effect of personal income taxation on the sensitivity of executive compensation to company performance and the use of stock option and restricted stock grants underlying this sensitivity. The theoretical model predicts that, if a single tax rate applies to the entire compensation package, an increase in the tax rate weakly diminishes the equilibrium level of managerial e...

This paper examines the effects of Information Technology (IT) on the governance structure of vertically-related firms that are applying IT in search of competitive advantage via superior efficiency. By adopting transaction costs and resource-based perspectives on IT and governance, this paper examines how different types of IT systems change the boundary of the firm. It is proposed that a high...

We study how both external corporate governance factors and internal corporate governance factors jointly affect the large shareholder’s takeover or monitor decision. The large shareholders monitor the management and have option to takeover the firm. External corporate governance forces impose stealing costs to the manager. In equilibrium, large shareholder’s takeover or monitoring decision, ta...

This paper investigates the differential impact of positive and negative excessive managerial entrenchment on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, compensation, firm performance. We measure degree using E-index introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Our findings suggest that an increase in excess reduces likelihood turnover due to poor also show a association between compensation as managers gai...

purpose: this paper addresses whether and how the sarbanes-oxley act of 2002(sox) affects shareholder wealth (firm value) by focusing on the trade-off between improved corporate governance leading to a lower cost of capital and increased managerial compliance costs of regulations. design/methodology: we use an analytical model of solving the management utility maximization function and the chan...