Security attacks are hard to understand, often expressed with unfriendly and limited details, making it difficult for security experts and for security analysts to create intelligible security specifications. For instance, to explain ”Why” (attack objective), ”What” (i.e., system assets, goals, etc.), and ”How” (attack method), adversary achieved his attack goals. We introduce in this paper a s...

When studying safety properties of (formal) protocol models, it is customary to view the scheduler as an adversary: an entity trying to falsify the safety property. We show that in the context of security protocols, and in particular of anonymizing protocols, this gives the adversary too much power; for instance, the contents of encrypted messages and internal computations by the parties should...

Background: Collecting data in the form of databases is one of the new methods that has been growing with the advancement of information technology. The use of databases in management and policy-making has created challenges in areas such as privacy breaches and compliance with accepted ethical norms. The increasing use of databases in public and private organizations in Iran has introduced new...

Networks of decoy nodes protect cyber systems by distracting and misleading adversaries. Decoy defenses can be further enhanced by randomizing the space of node IP addresses, thus preventing an adversary from identifying and blacklisting decoy nodes over time. The decoy-based defense results in a time-varying interaction between the adversary, who attempts to identify and target real nodes, and...