We present a novel model of corruption dynamics in the form of a nonlinear optimal dynamic control problem. It has a tipping point, but one whose origins and character are distinct from that in the classic Schelling (1978) model. The decision maker choosing a level of corruption is the chief or some other kind of authority figure who presides over a bureaucracy whose state of corruption is infl...

a r t i c l e i n f o Intermediaries that assist individuals and firms with the government bureaucracy are common in developing countries. Although such bureaucracy intermediaries are, anecdotally, linked with corruption and welfare losses, few formal analyses exist. We introduce a model in which a government license can benefit individuals. We study the net license gain when individuals get th...

This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are supposed to grant licences to firms that satisfy certain requirements. Firms have to invest into satisfying these requirements. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they give the licence to any firm in exchange for a bribe. Some firms prefer to buy the licence rather than to invest and satisfy ...

Recent scholarly attention has focused on weak governance and the negative effects of corruption on the provision of health services. Employing agency theory, this article discusses corruption in the South African health sector. We used a combination of research methods and triangulated data from three sources: Auditor-General of South Africa reports for each province covering a 9-year period; ...

systematic and widespread corruption; a problem in russia’s transition period russia is among those countries that are grappled with widespread and systematic corruption in state organizations. meanwhile, different russian governments have failed to reduce the scope of corruption. this article studies nature, roots and repercussions of corruption and analyzes approaches to combat it in russia. ...