Stopping games (without simultaneous stopping) are sequential games in which at every stage one of the players is chosen according to a stochastic process, and that player decides whether to continue the interaction or stop it, whereby the terminal payoff vector is obtained by another stochastic process. We prove that if the payoff process is integrable, a δ-approximate subgame perfect -equilib...

This paper is considering the competition between two multi-echelon supply-chains on price and service under balance and imbalance of market power between the chains which are analyzing through Nash and Stackelberg game approach. The problem is categorized as the centralized or decentralized structure of each chain, which means a few different possible scenarios are developing based on the Nash...

Many appealing multicast services such as on-demand TV, teleconference, online games and etc. can benefit from high available bandwidth in multi-radio multi-channel wireless mesh networks. When multiple simultaneous transmissions use a similar channel to transmit data packets, network performance degrades to a large extant. Designing a good multicast tree to route data packets could enhance the...

We extend the well-known fictitious play (FP) algorithm to compute pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria in private-value games of incomplete information with finite actions and con-tinuous types (G-FACTs). We prove that, if the frequency distribution of actions (fictitiousplay beliefs) converges, then there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium strategy that is con-sistent with i...

the aim of this research was to study those motivations underlying computer sport games in the youth. this study used a survey and cross – sectional method. the population consisted of 302 students of yazd university. the data were collected by the revised scale of computer sport games. results of the empirical test of the scale distributed among the participants in computer sport games showed ...

The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically di®erentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a ̄xed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process. J.E.L. classi ̄cation...

With many semi-anonymous players, the equilibria of simultaneousmove games are extensively robust. This means that the equilibria survive even if the simultaneous-play assumption is relaxed to allow for a large variety of extensive modifications. Such modification include sequential play with partial and differential revelation of information, commitments and multiple revisions of choices, chea...