In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payo is exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier results for two-person generosity games show that participants seem to care more for e ciency than for equity. In three-person generosity games equal agreement payo s for two of the players are either exogeno...

The paper extends existing work on inequality and economic development by estimating a cross-country structural model that identifies bi-directional relationships between income inequality and other indicators of social and economic development. Overall, lower inequality is associated with improvements in other development indicators, but this is the result of several complex interactions. The ...

The sign-propagation algorithm for inference with a qualitative probabilistic network has been designed to handle a single observation at a time. Multiple observations can in essence be dealt with by entering them consecutively and combining the results of the successive propagations, or by entering them for a newly added dummy node. We demonstrate that both approaches can yield weaker results ...

In 2003 the endless list of LATEX packages was enriched by the package pict2e, intended to substitute for the dummy one that has accompanied every LATEX distribution since 1994. This package implements everything as stated by Lamport in the second edition of his LATEX manual (for LATEX2ε). But if you explore the inner workings of the new pict2e, you discover the new package has some unexpected ...

We make use in this article of a testing procedure suggested by Robinson (1994) for testing deterministic seasonality versus seasonal fractional integration. A new test statistic is developed to simultaneously test both, the order of integration of the seasonal component and the need of seasonal dummy variables. Finite-sample critical values of the tests are computed and, an empirical applicati...

This paper attempts to study the consistency of several basic gametheoretic axioms. We focus on two of these: _q_qmmon_.knowledge (CK) and common sense (CS). Common knowledge assumes that the game itself and all other game-theoretic axioms imposed on the model are common knowledge~ Common sense assumes that when a player has a strictly dominant strategy, he/she will play it. We use the followin...