Over the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the share of executive compensation paid through stock options. We examine the extent to which tax policy has inuenced the composition of executive compensation, and discuss the implications of rising stock-based pay for tax policy. We begin by describing the tax rules for executive pay in detail and analyzing how changes in various...

The National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984 exemplifies high-stakes legislation that attracted the interest of the public, legislators, academics, policy advocates, and executive agencies. This paper explores how these actors combined to generate intellectual support for this act within the legislative process. Limitations of the contemporaneous research required that the available evidence b...

this study is sought to investigate the effects of motivational factors on improving financial monitoring of auditors and financial managers of executive devices in qom. a statistical population includes 95 auditors and financial managers of qom executive, and simple random sampling and statistical sample of research is 65 persons. the aim of the present study is applied research and data gathe...

The cost of executive stock options to shareholders has become a focus of attention in ̄nance and accounting. The di±culty is that the value of these options depends on the exercise policies of the executives. Because these options are nontransferable, the usual theory does not apply. We analyze the optimal exercise policy for a utility-maximizing executive and indicate when the policy is chara...

Managers make decisions on behalf of shareholders. In this context, financial economists have promoted executive stock options as a means to realign the incentives of managers with those of shareholders. We argue that overconfidence and optimism, which are likely to characterize managers, provide an alternative solution to this agency problem. Whereas risk-averse rational managers tend to postp...