the benefits of enterprise systems (es) are very varied and have been studied by scientists in this field over the years. but one aspect that is less noticed is the benefit result of the es implementation in the procurement process, which is very important to the contractor companies. the main objective and the purpose of this research is to address this important issue. other objective of the ...

The paper has benefited greatly from comments by an anonymous referee and numerous seminar participants as well as discussions with Abstract We ask how bargainers' incentives to communicate about more efficient widget designs depend on whether they negotiate price prior to, or after, fixing the traded design. We find three effects: (1) Since communication reveals information about preferences, ...

Background During the last three decades, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) in Iran has fallen considerably; from 6.5 per woman in 1983 to 1.89 in 2010. This paper analyzes the extent to which economic determinants at the micro and macro levels are associated with the number of children in Iranian households.   Methods Household data from the 2010 Household Expenditure and Income Survey (HEIS) is ...

This paper studies the effect of credit market competition, measured by the bargaining power of banks, on the agency costs of debt finance. The threshold of obtaining loan finance is shown to be independent of the relative bargaining power of the financier, while intensified credit market competition leads to lower lending rates and investment return distributions with lower, but less risky ret...

I use the health care industry as a novel laboratory in which to study a firm’s strategic use of debt to enhance their bargaining power during negotiations with non-financial stakeholders. I show that reimbursement rates negotiated between a hospital and insurers for a specific procedure are higher when the hospital has more debt. I also show that this effect is stronger when hospitals have les...

We propose a simple bargaining procedure, the equilibrium of which converges to the Walrasian allocation as the agents become increasingly patient. We thus establish that the competitive outcome obtains even if agents have market power and are not price-takers. Moreover, where in other bargaining protocols the final outcome depends on bargaining power or relative impatience, the outcome here is...

This research aims to provide insights into the determinants of channel profitability and the relative power in the channel by considering consumer demand and the interactions between manufacturers and retailers in an equilibrium model. In a departure from the standard empirical channel literature, which assumes that manufacturers set wholesale prices unilaterally, we explicitly model the negot...