We develop a price competition model for a new supply chain that competes in a market comprised of some rival supply chains. The new supply chain has one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer in which the manufacturer is a leader and retailer is a follower. The manufacturer pays a fraction of the risk cost (caused by demand uncertainty) to the retailer. We apply this competitiv...

In this study, the implications of the government’s tariffs on optimal pricing decisions in a dual-channel SC with one manufacturer and one retailer by taking into account the retailer services are examined. First, the best response strategies of retailer and manufacturer have obtained following the government’s tariffs by using a Stackelberg game model. Then, the government problem has modeled...

0377-2217/$ see front matter 2012 Elsevier B.V. A http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.09.003 ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +886 35742653; fax: E-mail address: [email protected] (U.-P. Wen This study considers pricing policies in a supply chain with one manufacturer, who sells a product to an independent retailer and directly to consumers through an Internet channel. In addition to the manu...

This study proposes a novel option-revenue sharing coordination contract framework. In the proposed model, the retailer determines the number of order sales effort. The manufacturer sets the price of products for the wholesale strategy. The investigated supply chain problem analyzes the results of different strategies. In the proposed coordination contract problem, two types of games including ...

The conflict between the manufacturer and the retailer except the double marginalization is an important issue in order to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. In the general case of the non-linear stochastic demand which also is affected by the sales effort of the retailer, this paper designs a new buy-back contract to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. On the base of developing th...

In this paper, we study return policy and supply chain coordination in a channel of one supplier and one retailer. The paper assumes that unsold merchandise should been refunded to the supplier by the retailer. The retailer knows the cost of reverse logistics operations but the supplier has to estimate it. The contract menu under asymmetric reverse logistics cost information between supply chai...

We study the effects of credit risk in a supply chain where one retailer deals with competing risky suppliers who may default during their production lead-times. The suppliers, who compete for business with the retailer by establishing wholesale prices, are leaders in a Stackelberg game with the retailer. The retailer, facing uncertain future demand, chooses order quantities while weighing the ...

Consider a two-level inventory system consisting of one supplier and one retailer. The retailer faces a Poisson demand with a known rate and applies base stock (one-for-one ordering) policy. That is, his inventory position is set to a pre-determined level, so the demand pattern is transferred exactly to the supplier. The supplier has an inventory system and a service unit with exponentially dis...

Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge financial support from the AGSM and INSEAD and would like to thank Information Resources, Incorporated for the data and Peter McBurney, University of Liverpool for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Abstract Competition among brands that sell through a supermarket chain is a repeated moderated oligopoly, where the retailer moderates br...

This paper considers a single-item, two-echelon, continuous-review inventory model. A number of retailers have their stock replenished from a central warehouse. The warehouse in turn replenishes stock from an external supplier. The demand processes on the retailers are independent Poisson. Demand not met at a retailer is lost. The order quantity from each retailer on the warehouse and from the ...