It is commonly believed that, since unanimity rule safeguards the rights of each individual, it protects minorities from the possibility of expropriation, thus yielding more equitable outcomes than majority rule. We show that this is not necessarily the case in bargaining environments. We study a multilateral bargaining model à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989), where players are heterogeneous with ...

In many countries with weak political institutions, new ventures face challenges such as political risks, corruption, and civil conflict, which can severely hinder their ability to survive and grow. We explore how establishing affiliations at founding with coercive institutional actors can help new ventures overcome challenges characteristic of weak and volatile political environments. Our find...

This paper hopes to make a contribution on three aspects of workkow systems: we stress the fact that there is a broken symetry between the level of the speciication of the procedures and the level of their enactment; we propose some ways of classifying activities and exceptions; and we propose some run-time functionalities to help users deal with exceptions.

* I would like to thank Philip Keefer for the institutional data. Responsibility for all errors, omissions, and opinions rests solely with the author. All findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. This paper assesses th...

This paper deals with modelling constraints in object-oriented databases, with emphasis given on exceptions. Constraints are restrictions on properties and relations of database objects that ensure the integrity of data. Therefore, they should be obeyed by every object, but as in real-life, there are some exceptions to this rule. Object-oriented databases provide rich semantic constructs, adequ...