We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and—in economic environments—sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is sufficient. Ex post monotonicity is satisfied in all single crossing environments with st...

We o er an alternative framework for the analysis of mutual funds and use it to examine the rationale behind existing regulations that require mutual fund adviser fees to be of the \fulcrum" variety. We nd little justi cation for the regulations. Indeed, we nd that asymmetric \incentive fees" in which the adviser receives a at fee plus a bonus for exceeding a benchmark index provide Pareto-domi...

Coordination in groups often converges to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium. In this paper we test the effect of changes to the payoff structure, focusing on the effect of increasing versus decreasing the onversus off-equilibrium payoffs, on equilibrium selection in coordination games. Our four treatments change the baseline coordination game payoff structure along two dimensions: 1) changing ...

We characterize optimal contracts for insurance coverage of a service whose price may vary across service providers. Households must engage in costly search to learn the price of a particular service firm, and the presence of insurance reduces incentive to search. There is a continuum of ex-ante identical consumers and firms. Search is simultaneous as in Burdett and Judd (1983). We construct a ...

We characterize optimal contracts for insurance coverage of a service whose price may vary across service providers. Households must engage in costly search to learn the price of a particular service firm, and the presence of insurance reduces incentive to search. We construct a general equilibrium model where the interaction of the insurer, consumers, and service firms endogenously determine t...

This paper reexamines the work of Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (J. Pub. Econ. 94: 768-776, 2010), which shows that leadership by the small region is the risk dominant equilibrium under the endogenous timing game. They obtain this result in a model where the asymmetry among countries translates into different gradients of the demand for capital but identical vertical intercept. In this note, we simpl...

We study optimal government policy in an economy where (i) search frictions create a coordination problem and generate multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria and (ii) the government finances the provision of a public good by taxing trade. The government must choose the tax rate before it knows which equilibrium will obtain, and therefore an important part of the problem is determining how the polic...